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We examined the relationship between employee equitycompensation, incentive compensation, and firmgrowth using a sample of 480 privately held firms
from the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation’s database of
Ernst & Young Entrepreneur Of The Year (EOY) winners.
Using frameworks from agency and motivation theories, we
argued that larger percentages of both equity- and incentive-
based compensation allocated to top managers and employees
would be associated with firm growth. After controlling for firm
and industry effects, the results of the study showed that while
the firms in the sample preferred providing incentive compensa-
tion, providing equity compensation for employees was a posi-
tively significant predictor of firm growth over a three-year peri-
od. These findings suggest that prescriptions for growth in larg-
er firms developed from agency theory also may be applicable to
entrepreneurial firms, and founder/CEOs seeking to grow their
firms should consider using equity compensation to motivate
their current employees and to attract new ones.
While financing growth has long been an area of intrigue
in entrepreneurship research (Brophy 1997; Mason and
Hamilton 2000), compensation of the employees who
assist the entrepreneur in achieving this growth remains a
virtually unresearched field (Heneman, Tansky, and Camp
2000). In one of the original studies of the successful man-
agement of rapid growth, Hambrick and Crozier (1985)
found that successfully growing firms provided their
employees with some sort of stake in the outcome of the
firm. However, this study was done before offering stock
or stock options to people in levels below senior manage-
ment became commonplace (Kambil, Eselius, and
Monteiro 2000), and most of the research in equity-based
compensation has continued to focus on senior managers
in relatively large firms (Rajagopalan 1997; Zahra,
Neubaum, and Huse 2000). 
Research in equity and incentive compensation issues is
relevant for entrepreneurial firms for several reasons.
First, funding in entrepreneurship research has historical-
ly focused on venture capital financing (Amit, Brander,
and Zott 2000). However, most entrepreneurial firms do
not seek venture capital (Bhide 1992; Brophy, 1997). This
suggests that these firms are obtaining financing by other
means, but as of yet it is not clear how those alternative
financing arrangements are structured (Mason and
Hamilton 2000). Since most growth-oriented firms are pri-
vately held companies, the study of the role of equity-
based compensation, incentive compensation, and firm
growth has been somewhat limited. Secondly, recruitment
and retention of talent is critical for entrepreneurial firms
(Brush, Greene, and Hart 2001). Determining whether
equity positions, incentive compensation, or a combina-
tion of these approaches is most appropriate would great-
ly assist entrepreneurs in their efforts to recruit and retain
top performers for their firms. Lastly, employee motiva-
tion both to stay and to perform is important for the entre-
preneurial firm to manage costs, stabilize the organization,
and provide organizational legitimacy (Cooper and Folta
2000; Greiner 1998; Reynolds 1987). These observations
raise several questions pertaining to equity and incentive
compensation in the entrepreneurial firm. Some of these
questions include: What is the relationship between own-
ership, incentive compensation and firm growth? Is equi-
ty- or incentive-based compensation a better predictor of
firm growth? How is ownership and incentive compensa-
tion distributed among entrepreneurial firms? In this arti-
cle we report the results of a study suggesting that while
the leadership of entrepreneurial firms may have a prefer-
ence for providing incentive compensation, equity com-
pensation may in fact be more strongly associated with
firm growth. 
The remainder of this article is divided into four sec-
tions. First, we will review some literature on ownership
allocations within an agency framework and use this liter-
ature to develop hypotheses of firm ownership allocations
and growth in entrepreneurial firms. Next, we review lit-
erature on incentive compensation and trace its roots in
motivation theory. From this discussion, we develop
hypotheses of incentive compensation and firm growth.
The next section describes the results of the tests of these
hypotheses using a sample of privately held entrepreneur-
ial firms from the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation’s
database of Ernst & Young Entrepreneur Of The Year
(EOY) winners. The article concludes with a discussion of
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the findings and some potential implications for both
managers and researchers on employee incentives and
growth in entrepreneurial firms. 
Agency Theory and Ownership in
Entrepreneurial Firms
Ownership issues in growth-oriented firms have not
received significant research attention, largely because it
has been an implicit assumption that the founder/CEO
and/or their family members control most if not all of the
firm’s equity (Kelly and Hay 2000; Markman, Balkin, and
Schjoedt 2001). Historically, research of ownership posi-
tions and firm performance have focused on publicly held
firms and those about to go public via an IPO (Certo et al.
2003; Dalton et al. 2003). Therefore, ownership-perform-
ance relationships in privately held or closely held
growth-oriented firms have not been a focus of this
research stream. While this is likely the case with lifestyle
firms (Bento and White 2001), the literature on teams and
IPOs suggest that this assumption may not be accurate
when considering the growth-oriented firm. Since the
strategies, organization structures, and perceptions of
growth-oriented firms are more likely to resemble those of
firms undergoing IPOs than those of lifestyle firms
(Cooper and Daily 1997; Sexton and Bowman-Upton 1991;
Siegel, Siegel, and MacMillan 1993), these literatures may
be a good source of information for theorizing about own-
ership structures in entrepreneurial firms. 
One of the most prominent characteristics associated
with successfully seeking outside funding is the quality of
a firm’s management team (Birley and Stockley 2000;
MacMillan, Siegel, and SubbaNarashima 1985). Indeed,
the idea that a management team rather than a single
entrepreneur typically promotes firm growth is common
in the entrepreneurship literature (Cooper and Bruno
1977; Cooper and Daily 1997; Eisenhardt and
Schoonhoven 1990), and recent research suggests that an
owner-controlled privately held firm with multiple man-
agement layers is more efficient than an owner-controlled
firm with a flat organizational structure or an agent-led
firm of either management structure (Durand and Vargas
2003). Some reasons for this thinking are the ability to
exert greater effort, reduced reliance on a single person,
complementary skills and knowledge, the lead entrepre-
neur’s ability to attract and manage people, and/or as an
initial check of the soundness of the venture idea (Cooper
and Daily 1997; Vesper 1990). 
Therefore, if the caliber of the management team is a
significant factor in firm growth, what is the most effec-
tive way to keep a good team together? Insights from
agency theory provide some useful ideas. While agency
theory has typically been used to explain behavior and
ownership structures in large firms (Barkema and
Gomez-Mejia 1998; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and
Meckling 1976; Stroh 1996), its use is becoming more
common in research of smaller and privately held firms
(Durand and Vargas 2003; Zahra et al. 2000) and
researchers have recently called for additional study of
principal-agent relationships in entrepreneurial settings
(Manigart and Sapienza 2000).
In the context of entrepreneurship research, principal-
agent issues are particularly relevant when studying
growing firms with a lead entrepreneur as CEO (Hitt,
Ireland, and Hoskisson 2001). One of the primary chal-
lenges of the entrepreneur of the growth-oriented firm is
to establish organizational legitimacy (Deephouse 1996;
Lounsbury and Glynn 2001). One way to gain legitima-
cy is to build a balanced team of professionals with
industry experience (Hambrick and Crozier 1985; Siegel
et al. 1993). Attracting and retaining talent has always
been a challenge for growth-oriented firms (Fombrun
and Wally 1989; Hambrick and Crozier 1985; Heneman
et al. 2000). This suggests that talented managers and
employees in growth-oriented firms further develop
their relatively unique set of talents and abilities
(Castanias and Helfat 2001) and are seen as attractive
assets to the firm. As a result, the entrepreneur must
seek ways to limit managerial opportunism (Moran and
Ghoshal 1996; Williamson 1993), which in this context
would likely mean that the manager might leverage his
or her firm knowledge and/or position to gain a posi-
tion with another firm or even start his or her own firm
(Autio 2000; Cooper and Folta 2000). A possible solution
to this problem may be to reduce the tensions inherent in
the principal-agent relationship by providing ownership
opportunities to the firm’s managers, and by extension
to its employees (Case 1995; Himmelberg, Hubbard, and
Palia 1999). Equity-based compensation has been used to
promote entrepreneurial behavior in larger firms (Block
and Ornati 1987; Ireland, Kuratko, and Hornsby 2001;
Sykes 1992). In addition to making it easier to attract
executive and professional level talent (Hambrick and
Crozier 1985), this approach also could be attractive to
the owners of the growth-oriented firm because it would
be comparatively inexpensive to monitor, thereby reduc-
ing agency costs (Banker et al. 1996) which is important
since cash is typically scarce in growth-oriented firms
(Reynolds 1987). These points are reflected in the follow-
ing hypothesis: 
H1: Equity ownership by employees will be
positively associated with growth in entrepre-
neurial firms.
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Incentive Compensation and Motivation
Theory in Entrepreneurial Firms
While broadening ownership may reduce agency costs
and encourage employees to think like owners, many
entrepreneurs find the thought of relinquishing control of
their firm unattractive (Cable and Shane 1997;
Greenberger and Sexton 1988; Kelly and Hay 2000;
Markman et al. 2001). Therefore, entrepreneurs may prefer
to try to motivate the employees of the firm through non-
equity-based incentive compensation (bonuses, profit
sharing, etc). The rationale for incentive compensation is
rooted in the expectancy theory of motivation (Vroom
1964). According to expectancy theory, motivation will be
high when employees believe that their efforts will lead to
high performance (expectancy), and that high perform-
ance will result in the attainment of particular outcomes
(instrumentality) and these outcomes are desired by the
employees (valence). The idea of incentive compensation
is based on the assumption that the opportunity for
increased compensation or benefits will motivate employ-
ees to raise or maintain their efforts to perform at a high
level. 
Like many areas of human resources research in small-
er firms, incentive compensation is a relatively neglected
topic (Heneman et al. 2000; Katz et al. 2000). This is
because research on the relationship between pay and firm
growth has again typically focused on senior management
in relatively large firms (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 1987;
1990; Barkema 1996; Boyd and Salamin 2001; Rajagopalan
1997). This research suggests that incentive pay is com-
monly used by firms that wish to encourage the identifica-
tion and pursuit of growth opportunities (Balkin and
Gomez-Mejia 1990; Boyd and Salamin 2001) and may be
more of a motivator for pursuing growth strategies than
equity-based compensation (Barkema 1996). A possible
explanation for this is that employees may feel that receiv-
ing rewards from incentive-based compensation is less
risky than equity-based compensation in the growing firm
(Beatty and Zajac 1994). 
In studies of nonsenior employees, incentive compensa-
tion has been found to be associated with lower turnover,
higher productivity, and enhanced performance in larger
firms, especially when combined with training (Delaney
and Huselid 1996). These findings are also somewhat sup-
ported by the few studies of incentive compensation in
smaller firms. Welbourne and Andrews (1996) found that
incentive compensation programs were negatively associ-
ated with IPO stock prices, but positively associated with
five-year survival rates. Chandler and McEvoy (2000)
found that incentive compensation did not predict firm
profitability but was a moderator of TQM implementation
effectiveness. Collectively, this literature suggests the fol-
lowing hypothesis: 
H2: Incentive compensation for employees will




Entrepreneurship research has historically been hin-
dered because of the relative lack of large, robust data-
bases containing financial performance data for entre-
preneurial ventures (Landstrom and Sexton 2000). This
is largely due to the fact that these firms are typically
privately held and therefore not required to release
financial information. To help address this difficulty, the
Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation has devoted sub-
stantial time and money to the development of large
sample databases that include financial data for entre-
preneurial firms. Because of these efforts, the 1998 Ernst
& Young Entrepreneur Of The Year Institute (EOYI)
database, codeveloped by the Ewing Marion Kauffman
Foundation and Ernst & Young, is used for the sample
for this study. The firms in this database were finalists in
the Ernst & Young Entrepreneur Of The Year award com-
petition. EOYI members are CEOs (primarily founders)
from arguably the most innovative and admired firms in
the world. They represent the “best of the best” in terms
of their contribution to growth, profitability, job cre-
ation, and economic impact.
Specific details of the development of the EOYI data-
base have been described by Cox, Ensley, and Camp
(2003). The EOYI database contains information on own-
ership structure, compensation policies, human resource
practices, and performance on 596 firms. These firms
averaged $100 million in sales during 1997, ranging from
less than $1 million to more than $7 billion. Average
annual sales growth rates for the sample ranged from
less than 5 percent to more than 110 percent. The data-
base is comprised primarily of firms in the manufactur-
ing, service, and wholesale trades. When compared to
the Longitudinal Establishment and Enterprise
Microdata database maintained by the U.S. Bureau of
the Census, the EOY database contains comparatively
larger firms, but is fairly representative of the distribu-
tion of firms in the United States. Considering that the
database consists of firms considered to be outstanding,
the size and performance differences between them and
the general population should not be surprising. This
study focused on the 480 privately held firms in the
database.
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Measures
Dependent Variables. It has been argued that profitabil-
ity-based measures may not be appropriate measures for
privately held firm performance because owners may shift
business profit and personal income in ways to minimize
their total tax liability (Hulse and Pope 1996). Also, while
profitability-based measures of performance work well for
larger firms with older assets in place, they are influenced
by historical costs and may not capture the value of
younger firms since smaller firms comprise a dispropor-
tionate number of new ventures (Keasey and Watson 1993;
Smith and Watts 1992). Conversely, there is a substantial
history of using variables such as growth in sales and/or
employees as a performance measure in studies of private-
ly held, growth-oriented firms due in part to the fact that
these variables are not subject to the age- and tax-related
limitations of profitability-related measures (Davidsson
and Wicklund 2000). Therefore, sales and employee
growth from 1995 through 1998 were used as the depend-
ent variables in this study (Baum, Locke, and Smith 2001;
Bento and White 2001). Three- to five-year time periods as
measures of performance and/or growth have often been
used in previous entrepreneurship research (Brush and
VanderWerf 1992; Davidsson 1991; Robinson and
McDougall 1998). 
Predictor Variables. Since approximately 55 percent
(260 of 480) of the firms in the sample had no employees
who owned any equity in their respective firm, we created
a dummy variable where: 1 = some equity ownership by
employees and 0 = no equity ownership by employees.
Since almost 99 percent (475 of 480) of the firms in the sam-
ple offered some sort of incentive compensation to their
employees, we measured incentive compensation as the
percentage of the firm’s total incentive compensation allo-
cated to the firm’s top managers and all other employees
respectively. 
Control Variables. To account for conditions at the
beginning of the study period, firm age in 1999 (Chandler
and Hanks 1994; Kazanjian and Drazin 1990) and the
amount of 1995 sales and the number of employees in 1995
were included as control variables (Davidsson and
Wicklund 2000). To control for potential leadership
changes, we measured CEO tenure as the number of years
the CEO had held the position. We also used several firm-
and industry level variables, measuring them as a percent-
age of total firm sales. We used total compensation
expense to control for varying degrees of labor intensive-
ness v. capital intensiveness across both firm and industry
settings. We included the firm’s international sales since
internationalization has been shown to be a predictor of
sales growth in small and/or privately held firms
(Bloodgood, Sapienza, and Almedia 1996; Burgel, Fier,
Licht, and Murray 2000). For industry-level effects, we
used R&D expense and sales and marketing expense to
control for the relative importance of basic research and
promotional intensity across industries (Dowling and
McGee 1994; Mizik and Jacobson 2003). 
Results
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables
in this study. It shows that the firms in the sample experi-
enced substantial growth in sales during the study period.
On average, sales and employees increased by 76 and 66
percent, respectively, from 1995 to 1998. Most of the firms’
incentive compensation goes to top managers (47.49%),
with all other employees receiving 30.36 percent of total
incentive compensation. While there are several statistical-
ly significant correlations, there are only 15 that are greater
than .3, and almost all of these are between the dependent
variables and/or the control variables. 
Table 2 reports the results of regressions of the control
and predictor variables on sales and employee growth. We
will use this information to test our hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that equity compensation would
be associated with firm growth. This hypothesis is sup-
ported. Equity compensation given to employees was a
significantly positive predictor of both sales and employee
growth (p<.1). Hypothesis 2 predicted that incentive com-
pensation for employees would be associated with firm
growth. None of the measures of incentive compensation
were significantly associated with either sales or employ-
ee growth. Therefore, this hypothesis was not supported.
Of the control variables, the number of employees (p<.001)
at the start of the study period positively predicted both
measures of growth, while CEO tenure negatively predict-
ed both measures of growth (p<.05 for sales, p<.1 for
employees). Sales at the beginning of the period predicted
sales growth (p<.001). Interestingly, total compensation
expense was a negative predictor of sales growth (p<.05)
but positively predicted employee growth (p<.01). Firm
age (p<.001) and internationalization (p<.1) were negative
predictors of sales growth.
Discussion
This study has helped address recent calls for further
investigation of agency effects in smaller and/or privately
held firms (Durand and Vargas 2003; Manigart and
Sapienza 2000; Zahra et al. 2000). Using our sample of
entrepreneurial firms, we found that CEO/entrepreneurs
prefer to provide incentive compensation rather than equi-
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ty compensation for senior management and other
employees. However, only equity-based compensation
was significantly associated with firm growth. This find-
ing suggests that CEO/entrepreneurs may be maintaining
control of their firms at the price of sustained growth, and
by extension, reducing their opportunities to create
wealth. We will now provide some possible explanations
for our findings. 
One possible explanation is the relative age of firms in
the sample. The average age was just over 19 years. So
while they were not new ventures (Brush and VanderWerf
1992; Robinson 1999), their equity and compensation pat-
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terns may still be reflective of conditions at the start of the
business (Boeker 1989; Brush and Chaganti 1998). Because
of this still relatively young age, these firms may not have
experienced the organizational crises where others in the
organization beyond the founder/CEO need to be given
more ownership for the firm to continue to survive and
grow (Greiner 1998). However, the age of the firms in the
sample does suggest that these firms were not “born to go
public,” which may indicate that the firms that provide
employee equity are not doing it so that employees can
cash out their positions in a future public offering. 
Resource-based theory may also provide some explana-
tions for these findings. Resource-based theory suggests
that firm resources and capabilities are socially complex
(Alvarez and Busenitz 2001) and relatively immobile
across firms (Barney 2001). If this is the case, the entrepre-
neur/CEO’s concerns about key people leaving the firm
are minimized because their skills and knowledge are con-
text-specific. Therefore, these sets of knowledge and skills
are both able to be retained by the rebundling of the firm’s
remaining knowledge, resources, and capabilities and not
be directly or completely transferable to other firms (Grant
1996). However, the findings are consistent with recent
research of larger firms which suggests that managers who
hold equity positions in the firm will place a greater
emphasis on internally generated innovation (Hoskisson
et al. 2002). Therefore, CEOs may be offering the equity as
a means to fuel the firm’s innovation and subsequent
growth. 
Explanations for the nonsignificance of incentive com-
pensation allocations and growth are not as clearly evi-
dent. However, a possible explanation might be found in
how compensation is perceived in growing firms. While
compensation is viewed in monetary terms, there is some
20 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
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evidence that benefits such as opportunities to do interest-
ing, meaningful work, learn new information and skills,
work with enjoyable and stimulating colleagues, and seek
work-life balance are also viewed as compensation by
employees of growth-oriented firms (Heneman et al.
2000). Therefore, the opportunity to have a voice in deter-
mining the future direction of the firm that an equity posi-
tion provides may be a reasonable part of a compensation
package in such a setting.
These findings certainly counter the contention that
founder/CEOs are the sole drivers of growth-oriented
firms. Recent research suggests that CEO motivation, tech-
nical and industry skills, and strategy selection significant-
ly influence firm growth even when other organizational
and environmental characteristics are accounted for
(Baum et al. 2001) and that the venture’s success hinges
largely upon the entrepreneur’s ability to the communi-
cate the firm’s story in ways that attract resources and
credibility to the firm (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001). With
that much riding on the entrepreneur’s shoulders, it is
understandable why he or she may be hesitant to relin-
quish control of the firm to others (Kelly and Hay 2000).
However, by encouraging employees to think like owners
through the granting of equity (Case 1995), the entrepre-
neur may help further develop the people of the firm to
take on greater responsibility of the day-to-day operations,
thereby allowing him or her to focus more on the firm’s
longer term strategic direction. 
As is the case with all studies, our findings must be
interpreted in light of our study’s limitations. One limita-
tion is that equity and incentive compensation positions
were measured at the end of the study period rather than
the beginning, which assumes they stayed the same dur-
ing the entire period. A second limitation may be related to
the nature of the sample. While all firms in the sample
were considered by at least some to be outstanding, not all
firms in the sample were growing rapidly. This could indi-
cate that the number of firms offering employee equity in
this sample may not be representative of the general pop-
ulation. We heartily encourage other researchers to
address these concerns in future studies. 
Conclusions 
While these limitations certainly provide research oppor-
tunities, there also appear to be abundant opportunities
for future research in rewards structures in growth-orient-
ed firms. For instance, the fact that the presence of equity-
based employee compensation moderately predicted firm
performance runs counter to the conclusion of Dalton and
colleagues’ (2003) recent meta-analysis, which found no
relationship between employee equity positions and firm
performance. This could suggest that the employee equi-
ty-performance relationship is a phenomenon unique to
entrepreneurial firms. Another area for further research
could be on the role compensation plays in the develop-
ment of organizational capabilities. While the role of the
founder/CEO cannot be denied, at some point the organi-
zation needs to develop capabilities beyond those of the
CEO if continued growth occurs (Brush et al. 2001). An
interesting question might be whether equity or incentive
compensation is more effective in encouraging the devel-
opment of organizational capabilities (Chandler and
McEvoy 2000). 
Our study shows that equity-based compensation is
associated with growth in privately held entrepreneurial
firms. Therefore, we find it interesting that what
Hambrick and Crozier (1985) found to be true almost 20
years ago about the role of equity compensation and the
successful management of growth may still be true today.
Founders and/or CEOs of privately held firms that wish
to become more entrepreneurial would do well to heed
their advice. 
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